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THE PURPOSE (AND LIMITS) OF THE UNIVERSITY
John Inazu*
Abstract
Scholars of the university have produced volumes about growing
pressures on the coherence and purpose of institutions of higher
education. Meanwhile, legal scholars’ writing about the university has
typically focused on its First Amendment dimensions. This Article links
insights from these two groups of scholars to explore the purpose of the
university and defend it against increasing technological, ideological, and
cultural pressures. It argues that a better understanding of the
relationship between the First Amendment and the university can help
strengthen the coherence of the university’s purpose against these
pressures. The connection between the First Amendment and institutional
purpose is in some ways unsurprising. Limits on expressive liberties have
always set the boundaries of expression for political communities, and the
university is a kind of political community. These boundaries reflect
something about a community’s goals, values, and—ultimately—its
purpose.
Part I sets forth a normative framework for the university as what the
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre terms a “place of constrained
disagreement.” The paradigmatic university under this framework reflects
three characteristics: it is dialogical, it is democratic, and it is residential.
Part II builds upon this understanding of the university by considering its
intersection with five contemporary First Amendment issues: academic
freedom, public employee speech, public forums, safe spaces, and
religious pluralism.
INTRODUCTION
After the Klan and the Neo-Nazis marched in Charlottesville in the summer of
2017, University of Virginia professor Chad Wellmon lamented his school’s tepid
response. The university’s president, Teresa Sullivan, had spoken vaguely of
*
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“ideologies and beliefs” that “contradicted our values of diversity, inclusion, and
mutual respect.”1 Wellmon longed for a more direct rebuke of racism and white
supremacy, but on reflection, he was not sure that kind of institutional response was
possible:
The contemporary university, at least in its local form in
Charlottesville, seems institutionally incapable of moral clarity. Individual
faculty members had spent the days and weeks before Saturday’s rally
denouncing and organizing against the white supremacists. But as an
institution, UVa muddled along through press releases, groping for a voice
and a clear statement . . . . Sullivan’s missives, especially her initial ones,
read like press releases from the bowels of a modern bureaucracy, not the
thoughts of a human responding to hate.
And that makes a lot of sense. What can the president of a
contemporary university say? The University of Virginia is many things—
a health center, a federal contractor, a sports franchise, an event venue,
and, almost incidentally, a university devoted to education and
knowledge. It is most often, as Clark Kerr wrote in 1963, a multiversity,
with little common purpose but the perpetuation of itself and its
procedures. Why should my colleagues and I look to our chief executive
for moral leadership? As a university president, Sullivan is, in the words
of Thorstein Veblen, a captain of erudition, not the leader of a community
bound to a common moral mission.2
Wellmon’s indictment is not limited to his own institution. The question of
purpose haunts most contemporary universities. Clark Kerr’s 1963 book identified
a central problem:
A university anywhere can aim no higher than to be as British as
possible for the sake of the undergraduates, as German as possible for the
sake of the graduates and the research personnel, as American as possible
for the sake of the public at large—and as confused as possible for the
sake of the preservation of the whole uneasy balance.3
The five decades since Kerr’s diagnosis have brought little clarity. Today,
academic disciplines fracture around ideology and methodology, and they
increasingly lack the shared linguistic resources even for internal, let alone cross-

1

Chad Wellmon, For Moral Clarity, Don’t Look to Universities, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/For-Moral-Clarity-DontLook/240921 [https://perma.cc/86LE-ZPMZ] [hereinafter Wellmon, Moral Clarity].
2
Id.
3
CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 14 (5th ed. 2001).

2018]

THE PURPOSE (AND LIMITS) OF THE UNIVERSITY

945

disciplinary, dialogue.4 A renewed wave of campus activism asks university
administrators to further “social justice,” although the particulars of what that means
are not always clear.5 In some cases, the pressure to land federal research dollars or
succeed in big-time athletics compromises the university’s academic mission.6
Scholars of the university have produced volumes about these and other
challenges to higher education.7 Meanwhile, legal scholars’ writing about the
4
Myra H. Strober, Communicating Across the Academic Divide, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Jan. 2, 2011), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Communicating-Acrossthe/125769 [https://perma.cc/2RH3-JTDW] (“Although people outside of universities seem
to think that faculty members talk to one another across their fields of study . . . substantive
conversations are infrequent.”). For a compelling account of the growing epistemic divides
within the discipline of political science, see JOHN GUNNELL, DESCENT OF POLITICAL
THEORY 1 (1993) (providing a “reconstruction of the hereditary derivation and ancestral
extraction of the enterprise of academic political theory”).
5
See, e.g., Allison Stanger, Understanding the Angry Mob at Middlebury that Gave Me
a Concussion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/opinion
/understanding-the-angry-mob-that-gave-me-a-concussion.html
[https://perma.cc/CLL725LC] (opinion piece by Middlebury College professor injured during protests opposing talk
by Charles Murray).
6
See, e.g., Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. & Bruce B. Svare, Hijacked by an External Funding
Mentality, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 25, 2016) (chronicling the pressures and consequences
of faculty who pursue federal research dollars); GEORGE FALLIS, MULTIVERSITIES, IDEAS,
AND DEMOCRACY 56 (2007) (“The magnitude and rapid expansion of U.S. federal
commitments to university research are, in retrospect, astonishing. From 1953 to 1968,
federal funding jumped ninefold, adjusted for inflation. That fifteen-year interval has been
dubbed ‘the golden age’ . . . . Nonetheless, federal commitments continued to expand
thereafter. In 1980, funding stood at U.S. $4.1 billion and rose to U.S. $13 billion by 1995.”);
see generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
(2011) (exploring the effects of collegiate sports on academic and administrative functions);
Michael Powell, North Carolina’s Dominance Fails to Cover Cheating’s Stain, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/sports/ncaabasketball/northcarolina-final-four-cheating-fake-classes.html [https://perma.cc/8YRV-H9E9] (“Put simply,
for two decades until 2013, the university provided fake classes for many hundreds of student
athletes, most of them basketball and football players.”).
7
John Henry Newman’s The Idea of the University is perhaps the most well-known
study of the purpose of the university. JOHN H. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY
DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED (1852) (writing on the objective duty of the university); see also
ELLEN CONDLIFFE LANGEMANN, WHAT IS COLLEGE FOR? T HE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 9–46 (2012) (commenting on the indifference on matters of the college’s
purposes); see generally JOHN H. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(Bradley C.S. Watson ed. 2011) (addressing the relativism on the idea of core curriculum);
STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (2007) (discussing theology and the characteristics of the modern
university); WILLIAM DERESIEWICZ, EXCELLENT SHEEP: THE MISEDUCATION OF THE
AMERICAN ELITE AND THE WAY TO A MEANINGFUL LIFE (2014) (commenting on the dearth
of critical thinking among the educated class); THE UNIVERSITY NEXT DOOR: WHAT IS A
COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITY, WHO DOES IT EDUCATE, AND CAN IT SURVIVE? (Mark
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university have typically focused on its First Amendment dimensions rather than on
the challenges to its institutional coherence.8 For example, Robert Post has examined
the pedagogical implications of the university’s unique blend of academic inquiry
and free speech.9 Mary-Rose Papandrea has argued for strengthening student speech
protections in light of the university’s role as “the quintessential marketplace of
ideas.”10 And Paul Horwitz has suggested that the university is the paradigmatic
example of a “First Amendment institution” that warrants special constitutional
consideration.11
This Article links insights from these two groups of scholars to explore the
purpose of the university and defend it against growing technological, ideological,
and cultural pressures. The connection between the First Amendment and
institutional purpose is unsurprising. Expressive restrictions always set the
boundaries of expression for political communities, and the university is a kind of
political community. These boundaries reflect something about a community’s
goals, values, and—ultimately—its purpose.
Part I briefly sets forth a normative framework for a university that is dialogical,
democratic, and residential. Part II builds upon this understanding of the university
by considering its intersection with five contemporary First Amendment issues:
academic freedom, public employee speech, public forums, safe spaces, and
religious pluralism.

Schneider & KC Deane eds. 2015) (opining on whether comprehensive universities can
respond to the nation’s call to action); CHAD WELLMON, ORGANIZING ENLIGHTENMENT:
INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY
(2015) (detailing key role of research universities in developing modern information culture).
8
The word “university” imperfectly captures the class of institutions that most
contemporary scholars assume in writing about institutions of higher education. It also
includes colleges whose lack of certain professional schools formally distinguishes them
from universities but which otherwise share the characteristics of the institutions of higher
education that usually occupy the core of First Amendment analysis.
9
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 67–69 (2012). In another book
coauthored with Matthew Finkin, Post takes a different approach and focuses only on
“professional understandings of academic freedom” to the exclusion of “[t]he constitutional
law of academic freedom.” MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 8 (2009). Post and Finkin suggest
that the “consensus vision of the purposes of American higher education” has concluded that
“[u]niversities and colleges are autonomous professional institutions dedicated to creating
new knowledge and to educating young adults to think for themselves.” Id. at 7; see also
STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 3–18 (2008) (discussing the role of
the university and its members).
10
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 1801, 1802 (2017).
11
PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 140 (2013).
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I. WHAT IS A UNIVERSITY?
Kerr’s characterization of the university as a “multiversity” remains accurate;
most institutions of higher education are unable to articulate a singular, unified
purpose.12 In the face of such confusion, this Article argues that a central purpose, if
not the central purpose, of the university is to be a place of facilitating disagreement
across differences, what the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has termed a “place of
constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in conflict.”13 The paradigmatic
university pursuing this purpose embodies least three core characteristics: it is
dialogical; it is democratic; and it is residential.
A. The Dialogical University
The first characteristic of a university oriented toward constrained
disagreement is that it is dialogical. Under MacIntyre’s vision, “a central
responsibility of higher education would be to initiate students into conflict.”14 The
process requires participants “to enter into controversy with other rival standpoints,
doing so both in order to exhibit what is mistaken in that rival standpoint . . . and in
order to test and retest the central theses advanced from one’s own point of view
against the strongest possible objections to them.”15 John Courtney Murray’s
succinct formulation adds another dimension: the university should be a place where
creeds are intelligibly at war with one another.16
MacIntyre and Murray hint at two necessary conditions for genuine argument
within the university: disagreement must be constrained,17 and creedal war must
proceed intelligibly.18 Constraint and intelligibility create the possibility of genuine
dialogue across difference. Disagreement without any constraints would open the
door to manipulation and even violence. Similarly, creedal war with no intelligibility
would render communication impossible. On the other hand, we never attain perfect
constraint and complete intelligibility—to do so would mean overcoming the
nuances of human emotion and the limits of interpersonal communication. In the
12

I mean to highlight challenges to the coherence of purpose within specific institutions,
as distinct from the properly diverse purposes represented by different kinds of institutions.
See John Garvey, Introduction, AALS Symposium on Institutional Pluralism: The Role of
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125, 127 (2009) (discussing the
importance of “institutional pluralism”).
13
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 230–31 (1990) [hereinafter MACINTYRE,
MORAL ENQUIRY].
14
Id. at 231.
15
Id. at 231.
16
JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 125 (1960).
17
MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 13, at 230–32.
18
MURRAY, supra note 16, at 125–130.
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university, most of our disagreements are modestly constrained and our creedal wars
somewhat intelligible.
These conditions suggest a shared commitment to a mode of discourse that
could encourage some of the university’s deepest values. That is no small
achievement. As Chad Wellmon observes, “these values are not simply bureaucratic
or professional procedures.”19 Rather, “[t]hey are robust epistemic virtues—an
openness to debate, a commitment to critical inquiry, attention to detail, a respect
for argument—embedded in historical practices particular to the university.”20
The significance of modestly constrained disagreement can be shown by
contrasting two controversial figures: Ann Coulter and Charles Murray.21 In 2017,
Coulter and Murray both made national headlines when colleges and universities
revoked speaking invitations extended to them by student groups.22 For this thought
experiment about constrained disagreement, think of Murray and Coulter as points
along a spectrum, with Murray closer to modest constraint and Coulter closer to the
lack of any constraints. Many progressives dislike both Murray and Coulter.23 But
on our spectrum of constrained disagreement, there is a lot of distance between these
two figures. Murray is a scholar who is willing to respond to questions and engage
in debate. Coulter is a bomb thrower who delights in insulting those with whom she
disagrees. In other words, even if Coulter’s argument satisfies John Courtney
Murray’s intelligibility condition, it lacks MacIntyre’s condition of constrained
disagreement. We might say that Charles Murray plays by the university’s rules of
the game and Coulter does not.
We can make similar distinctions at the other end of the political spectrum. The
Black Lives Matter activist who delivers a university lecture about methods of
protests and the reasons underlying those protests is adhering to the university’s
discourse-enabling constraints on disagreement. The same activist who disrupts the
speech of a university administrator shows little commitment to these constraints.
The differences between Ann Coulter and Charles Murray, and the differences
between the activist as interlocutor and the activist as disruptor, demonstrate the
modest constraints that shape a university’s discourse. The law enforces the outer
boundaries of these constraints. Student activists cannot incite imminent
lawbreaking.24 English professors cannot teach calculus in their poetry classes. And
19

Wellmon, Moral Clarity, supra note 1.
Id.
21
Coulter is a conservative political commentator, and Murray is a conservative
scholar. Both have made highly controversial claims in their speaking and writing.
22
See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, In Ann Coulter’s Speech Battle, Signs that Conservatives
Are Emboldened, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/
politics/ann-coulter-university-of-california-berkeley.html [https://perma.cc/7KFJ-HZM7];
Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell Curve” Author at Vermont College,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/middlebury-collegecharles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html [https://perma.cc/U7G5-46LS].
23
Peters, supra note 22.
24
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
20
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university administrators cannot limit access to a public dialogue based on race,
gender, or sexuality. But most other discourse constraints are not legally
enforceable—they arise out of customary norms and civic practices that we ask of
one another.25
Constraint and intelligibility are only half of MacIntyre’s and Murray’s
formulations. Genuine argument also means real disagreement and the possibility of
creedal war. Many of these disagreements and conflicts will involve imbalances of
power; two sides of a creedal war seldom reach cultural and political equilibrium.
When two sides respectively represent “minority” and “majority” positions, it is
important to allow minority perspectives to be voiced. Often, a willingness to listen
to these perspectives is embedded in the customary norms of the university. But on
some of the most contested political, religious, and ideological issues, it is easy to
think of examples where certain perspectives are explicitly or implicitly excluded.
The dialogical university works to protect against these exclusions under conditions
of constrained agreement and intelligibly warring creeds.
B. The Democratic University
The second university characteristic oriented toward facilitating disagreement
across difference is the democratic nature of higher education. As Andrew Delbanco
has suggested, “the college classroom has been a rehearsal space for democracy—a
place where students learn to speak and listen with civility to peers whose
perspective on the world differs from their own.”26 The democratic university must
also strive to protect minority, dissenting, or unpopular views—an aspiration that
draws its inspiration from the First Amendment. The history of our country suggests
that civic practices and cultural norms can quickly turn hostile against unpopular
and dissenting viewpoints. The First Amendment at its best shields and protects
these viewpoints from majoritarian suppression, sometimes at great cost. As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much” and the test of freedom is “the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order.”27
The First Amendment expressly governs public universities and informs the
culture and norms of many private universities.28 The distinction between public and

25

See generally JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING
THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016) (providing an extended discussion of these aspirational
civic practices).
26
ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BE xiii-xiv (2012).
27
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
28
See, e.g., UNIV. OF PA., HANDBOOK FOR FACULTY AND ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATORS
(2017),
http://provost.upenn.edu/uploads/media_items/ii-a-academic-freedom-andresponsibility.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q4A-92NQ] (granting faculty members at the
private University of Pennsylvania “freedom of inquiry,” “freedom in research” and
“freedom in the classroom”); Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and
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private universities is both longstanding and important.29 In fact, some private
universities with religious or other missions properly constrain aspects of discourse
based on their institutional purpose.30 But even within these constraints, the
normative aspirations of the First Amendment can still function to protect minority,
dissenting, and unpopular views.
Public institutions can also adopt these cultural norms; in other words, they can
view themselves not only as constitutionally constrained by the First Amendment
but also as occupying a particular social role that embodies First Amendment values.
Consider, for example, this passage from the plurality opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.31
Sweezy identifies an instrumental role that the public university plays in preparing
future generations of citizens.32 But the university also enacts the aspirations of
democratic governance when it models the free exchange of ideas, facilitates
relationships across deep difference, and points the next generation of leaders toward
the possibility of a shared political project.33
Duties of Law Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REV. 253, 264–65 (2003) (noting that
university customs may protect faculty members’ academic freedom at private universities).
29
See, e.g., Safia Samee Ali, Harvard Revokes Admission of Several Students for
Posting ‘Offensive’ Memes, NBCNEWS.COM (June 5, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/harvard-revokes-admission-several-students-posting-offensive-memesn768361 [https://perma.cc/H4UK-GTE2] (quoting law professor Katherine Franke as
saying, “The First Amendment’s Free Speech protections apply only to violations by public
entities, and since Harvard is a private university the First Amendment does not apply.”).
Additionally, public schools ostensibly serve public purposes, while private schools might
advance non-public missions, as in the case of some religious colleges and universities.
30
See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Fall From Grace, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 15, 2011),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/08/15/fall-grace
[https://perma.cc/HPD2BJ3A] (detailing science faculty member’s resignation from Calvin College over publication
in tension with official school doctrine); Lauren Jones, Note, Straddling the Wall: Academic
Freedom in Religious Universities and How Institutions May Engage in Judicious SelfRegulation, 30 REV. LITIG. 319, 320 (2011) (noting Catholic University of America’s 1989
policy prohibiting faculty members from advocating pro-choice politics).
31
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
32
Cf. DELBANCO, supra note 26, at 29 (“It should be obvious that the best chance we
have to maintain a functioning democracy is a citizenry that can tell the difference between
demagoguery and responsible arguments”).
33
Nor are these merely antiquated notions from an earlier era. Justice O’Connor drew
upon similar connections in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that
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These democratic aspirations will not be realized to the same extent at every
institution of higher education. Some private institutions will prioritize other
aspirations to varying degrees. But differences will also unfold among public
institutions. Not every public school will accommodate constrained disagreement
and intelligibly warring creeds. In other words, not every public school will share
the same purpose or institutional culture. A community college is not the same as a
public research university. A satellite campus of the University of Wyoming is not
the same as the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. The United States Military
Academy is not the same as the University of California at Berkeley. Each of these
institutions has a public-facing mission, but not all represent what Paul Horwitz has
characterized as the “paradigmatic example of a First Amendment institution.”34
Despite these institutional differences, the Supreme Court has assumed
something like Horwitz’s ideal when addressing the First Amendment in the higher
education context.35 For example, in its 1972 decision Healy v. James, the Court
asserted that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”36 The year after Healy, the Court underscored that “the mere
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state
university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of
decency.’”37
“universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition” in light of “the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment”). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has suggested that the “public” nature of public universities might be different in
kind than other public governmental functions. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 203
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (suggesting a “constitutional distinction between the
infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder
administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
908 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that the First Amendment “may speak with
a different voice” when the government acts in its non-sovereign capacity).
34
HORWITZ, supra note 11. Horwitz highlights some unique aspects of the university:
academic freedom, tenure, curricular development, selective admissions, and student speech.
Id. at 109–10, 122–28. But the most important function of the university, in his view, is a
“uniquely academic contribution to public discourse.” Id. at 120–21. Even the modern
research university falls short of this ideal. Consider, for example, Horwitz’s home
institution, the University of Alabama. Some of its scholars contribute to the pursuit of
knowledge, but major sections of the university focus on alumni partnerships, affiliated
hospitals and clinics, and high-profile athletics, all of which have little to do with “public
discourse.”
35
Importantly, that doctrine has largely assumed the same basic understanding of the
university adopted in this Article: the four-year residential institution of higher education.
36
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972).
37
Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973). The university’s interest in the
free exchange ideas does not compel other governmental actors to guarantee the fullness of
that exchange against all competing interests. In a case decided three days after Healy, the
Supreme Court overruled a lower court’s holding that the First Amendment interests of
American scholars who had invited a Belgian Marxist to participate in academic conferences
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The Court’s reliance on the First Amendment to protect universities from
majoritarian orthodoxies predates Healy. It prevailed even in the face of the Second
Red Scare when many other sectors of society capitulated to fear-mongering and
charges of guilt by association. In 1957, Sweezy rebuffed efforts by state officials
to inquire into the political affiliations of faculty.38 Insisting that “teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding,”39 the plurality made clear that compelling a professor
to disclose the nature of his past expressions and associations ran afoul of the First
Amendment.40 In three subsequent decisions, the Court struck down laws restricting
universities from employing members of the Communist Party.41
These hard-fought battles established basic principles that transcend ideology.
In the 1950s, public universities sought to exclude socialist and communist ideas.42
Today, some of these same schools sometimes target politically conservative

required the government to grant him a visa to enter the country. See Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). The Court held that the Attorney General’s justifications for
granting or denying visas under the authority delegated to him under the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 need not be balanced against “the First Amendment interests of those
who seek personal communication with the [visa] applicant.” Id. Even so, the majority
acknowledged that the public’s right to receive information “is nowhere more vital than in
our schools and universities.” Id. at 763 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Marshall’s
dissent also called attention to the academic nature of the proposed interactions. Id. at 774
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Dr. Ernest Mandel, a citizen of Belgium, is an internationally
famous Marxist scholar and journalist. He was invited to our country by a group of American
scholars who wished to meet him for discussion and debate. With firm plans for conferences,
colloquia and lectures, the American hosts were stunned to learn that Mandel had been
refused permission to enter our country.”).
38
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 254–55.
39
Id. at 250.
40
Id. at 254–55.
41
See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 368 (1964) (finding unconstitutionally vague
state statutes requiring University of Washington faculty and staff to take loyalty oaths as a
condition of employment); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 60 (1967) (finding state loyalty
oath applicable to teachers at the University of Maryland hostile to academic freedom);
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (finding unconstitutional state statutes
that prevented the public employment of university teachers unless they certified that they
were not members of the Communist Party or subversive groups).
42
Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564 n.6 (1956) (quoting ASS’N OF
AM UNIVS., THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR FACULTIES
(Mar. 24, 1953)) (“Above all, [the university professor] owes his colleagues in the university
complete candor and perfect integrity, precluding any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial
activities. He owes equal candor to the public. If he is called upon to answer for his
convictions it is his duty as a citizen to speak out. It is even more definitely his duty as a
professor. . . . In this respect, invocation of the Fifth Amendment places upon a professor a
heavy burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university
an obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society.”).
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speakers.43 The exclusion of ideas or ideologies, simply because one finds them
unpleasant or dangerous, is usually inconsistent with the role of the democratic
university as a place of genuine inquiry and debate.44
C. The Residential University
The final characteristic of the kind of university best situated to pursue the
MacIntyrean aim of constrained disagreement is one whose programs, place, and
people allow for deep and sustained dialogue across difference. Although a variety
of institutions might fill this role, the paradigmatic example is the residential
university.
Dialogue within the residential university is complicated by the intersection of
multiple actors, roles, and places. In one sense, the same could be said of many other
settings. For example, police officers may speak in their official capacities or as
private citizens; they may express themselves on the job or in a private setting; and
they may confront challenges in their use of social media that complicates keeping
their roles distinct.45 But the university is a more complex version of this general
puzzle.46 It encompasses administrators, faculty, students, staff, and visitors. Some
of these actors perform multiple roles. As a faculty member, I am an employee,
teacher, researcher, and community member at my institution. Some of my roles
unfold in multiple places. And I am not alone. Students find themselves in
classrooms, dorm rooms, common spaces, off-campus settings, and online forums.
The different actors, roles, and places of the university commonly intersect with one
another, with each combination implicating different norms and values. These varied
contexts also mean that free speech is not an unqualified value or absolute norm
across the entire university.47
43

See supra note 22.
But see Ulrich Baer, What “Snowflakes” Get Right About Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/what-liberal-snowflakesget-right-about-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/2QPE-8X58] (“The great value and
importance of freedom of expression, for higher education and for democracy, is hard to
overestimate. But it has been regrettably easy for commentators to create a simple dichotomy
between a younger generation’s oversensitivity and free speech as an absolute good that leads
to the truth.”).
45
See, e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (First Amendment does not
protect police officer from adverse employment action for selling videotapes of sexually
explicit acts he undertook off-duty in a police uniform); Heffernan v. Paterson, 578 U.S.
1412, 1416 (2016) (First Amendment protects off-duty police officer from adverse
employment action for perceived political activity).
46
For thoughtful considerations of the unique characteristics of the university within a
broader First Amendment landscape, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS:
PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 259–93 (2009); PAUL
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2012).
47
The observation applies to the First Amendment more generally. For example, while
the text of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make “no law” abridging
44
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The residential university is a complex physical place, a separate “town” of
sorts, playing host to a variety of campus spaces with numerous purposes. 48 For
students, the university encompasses every aspect of life: eating, sleeping,
exercising, and socializing. Many students live on campus, and even those who live
off campus often cluster together in groups. These realities have not gone unnoticed,
and smart people have spent a lot of time thinking about the benefits of this
proximity.49 There is something to be said for carefully constructed shared spaces
like dorm commons, dining halls, campus coffee shops, gyms with smoothie bars,
and other places to congregate.50 These spaces also provide a degree of safety and
stability important to providing the background conditions for dialoguing across
difference.51 And even in this era of social media, online education, and virtual

speech, Congress makes all kinds of speech-restricting laws. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004); DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 263
(2008) (making a similar observation).
48
See, e.g., Hays Cty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Roughly
5,000 students live and work on the campus, making the campus, in the words of the
University’s own promotional booklet, a ‘town’ of which the resident student will be a
‘contributing citizen’ and ‘voting member.’”); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976–77 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“A modern university contains a variety of fora. Its facilities may include private
offices, classrooms, laboratories, academic medical centers, concert halls, large sports
stadiums and arenas, and open spaces . . . . Some places on the University’s campus, such as
the administration building, the president’s office, or classrooms are not opened as fora for
use by the student body or anyone else . . . . Other campus locations, such as auditoriums or
stadiums allow for certain speech on certain topics. These locations may be described as
designated public fora. Further, the public streets and sidewalks which surround the campus
but are not on the campus likely constitute traditional public fora . . . .”).
49
See, e.g., Lauren T. Schudde, The Causal Effect of Campus Residency on College
Student Retention, 34 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 581, 581 (2011); Ruth N. Lopez Turley &
Geoffrey Wodtke, College Residence and Academic Performance: Who Benefits from Living
on Campus?, 45 URBAN EDUC. 506 (2010); Gary R. Pike, The Differential Effects of On- and
Off-Campus Living Arrangements on Students’ Openness to Diversity, 39 NASPA J. OF
STUDENT AFFS. RES. & PRAC. 283 (2002).
50
As one college student quipped, “In a university with a student body diverse enough
that students may feel that they have little in common, a literal common ground is needed.”
Sarah C. Stein Lubrano, The Productivity of Social Space: Harvard should replace its student
center, HARV. CRIMSON, (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.thecrimson.com/column/exodoxa/
article/2012/4/18/social-space-productivity/ [https://perma.cc/XM2C-484Q].
51
The prevalence of sexual assault, and the far less frequent but still psychologically
unsettling risk of campus shootings both qualify this claim of safety in important ways. These
questions become more complicated at schools with large percentages of students who live
off-campus or where questions surrounding safety and material provisions are exacerbated
by wealth disparities among students. See, e.g., Janese Silvey, Tiger Pantry aims to feed MU
community, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.columbiatribune.com
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relationships, there remains value in face-to-face interactions facilitated through
shared physical space. This is not to say that virtual interactions can never
accomplish the pedagogical or relational goals of the university.52 But shared space
and personal dialogue that incorporates physical presence can enhance these goals
in meaningful ways.53
Another important aspect of the residential university is the typical age of its
students. The Supreme Court generally looks to the age of students in distinguishing
between student speech in universities and in secondary schools. Even though Healy
came just three years after the Court’s seminal decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,54 the Court chose not to apply the standard
set forth in Tinker.55 In subsequent student speech cases, the Court has suggested
that at least part of the justification for weaker First Amendment protections in
secondary schools rests on the developmental stage of the students. For example, in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a case involving secondary students, the
/f917a28f-0151-5632-8b82-e2c30ac236b1.html
[https://perma.cc/49VK-MEVZ]
(describing a food pantry for staff and students at the University of Missouri and quoting the
pantry’s director explaining that “[a]lthough hunger is not a visible problem on campus,
based on the number of students receiving financial aid, food insecurity is an issue”).
52
See generally John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013)
(discussing some of the relational possibilities of virtual interactions).
53
Justice Marshall remarked on this difference in a footnote in his dissent in Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). Disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning that a Belgian
Marxist denied an American visa could nonetheless send taped lectures, Marshall observed:
The availability to appellees of Mandel’s books and taped lectures is no substitute
for live, face-to-face discussion and debate, just as the availability to us of briefs
and exhibits does not supplant the essential place of oral argument in this Court’s
work. Lengthy citations for this proposition, which the majority apparently
concedes, are unnecessary. I simply note that in a letter to Henrik Lorenz,
accepting an invitation to lecture at the University of Leiden and to discuss “the
radiation problem,” Albert Einstein observed that, “[i]n these unfinished things,
people understand one another with difficulty unless talking face to face.”
Id. at 776 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Developments in the Law—The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1154 n.101 (1972)). Our modes
of communication have advanced since Marshall wrote in 1972 (or Einstein before him), but
personal interaction remains unmatched by its technologically mediated surrogates.
54
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
55
In university cases, the Court usually only cites Tinker in support of the principle that
the First Amendment applies to the public university. See generally Christian Legal Soc’y v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000); Minn. St. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667
(1973). Mary-Rose Papandrea has observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has cited Tinker in
some of its university speech cases, but it has never relied on the Tinker standard to restrict
speech” in those cases. Papandrea, supra note 10, at 1841.
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Court noted “the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities
acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”56
The Court has hinted that these concerns may not apply in the university
context. In Widmar v. Vincent, the majority mentioned in a footnote that college
students were “less impressionable than younger students.”57 And in Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, Justice Souter’s
concurrence observed that the Court’s “cases dealing with the right of teaching
institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high
schools, whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education.”58
There may have been a time, as Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in
Morse v. Frederick,59 when a college professor’s relationship with his students was
more akin to that of a high school teacher.60 But as the Third Circuit has noted, in
the modern era, the “public university has evolved into a vastly different creature.”61
The “authoritarian role of today’s college administrations has been notably

56

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (“This Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest
of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and
the audience may include children. . . . These cases recognize the obvious concern on the
part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially
in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech” (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) and Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions))).
57
454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (1981) (noting that college students, as “young adults . . . . are
less impressionable than younger students”); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
685 (1971) (“There are generally significant differences between the religious aspects of
church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary
schools.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015) (“key rationales for
restricting students’ speech are to ensure that students ‘are not exposed to material that may
be inappropriate for their level of maturity . . . .’[but] [c]oncerns about student maturity
cannot justify restrictions on speech in [the graduate school] context because certification
candidates are adults” (internal citations omitted)).
58
529 U.S. 238, n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
59
551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (permitting a school to regulate speech reasonably seen as
promoting drug use because of the “‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ and
the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse,” where the speech was a student
poster reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”).
60
Id. at 412 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that in an earlier era, “[e]ven at the
college level, strict obedience was required of students,” as teaching models “fostered
absolute institutional control of students by faculty both inside and outside the classroom.”
(citing Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey
and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1991))).
61
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2010).
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diluted.”62 Meanwhile, students have assumed some rights and responsibilities
formerly held by administrators.63 In fact, “[e]ighteen-year-old students are now
identified with an expansive bundle of individual and social interests and possess
discrete rights not held by college students from decades past . . . . [T]oday students
vigorously claim the right to define and regulate their own lives.”64
Lower courts have examined more directly whether “the free speech standards
that developed in K–12 school cases apply in the university setting.”65 Their
conclusions have been less than clear.66 The Seventh Circuit illustrates the
62

Id. (citing Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979)). The Third
Circuit even notes that the “idea that public universities exercise strict control over students
via an in loco parentis relationship has decayed to the point of irrelevance.” McCauley, 618
F.2d at 245; see also Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that colleges
do not act in loco parentis per New York law).
63
McCauley, 618 F.2d at 244 (quoting Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138–40).
64
Id. at 245 (quoting Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140).
65
See, e.g., Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 519 n.5 (Minn. 2012); see also
Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over
College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 46–49 (2008)
(observing that courts have struggled with adapting First Amendment doctrine from
elementary and high schools to the university).
66
See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318
(3d Cir. 2008) (writing that courts “must proceed with greater caution [than in high school
cases] before imposing speech restrictions on adult students at a college campus”); Hosty v.
Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
13195 (7th Cir. 2003), different result reached on reh’g, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11761 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“Hazelwood’s rationale for limiting the First Amendment rights of high school
journalism students is not a good fit for students at colleges or universities. The differences
between a college and a high school are far greater than the obvious differences in curriculum
and extracurricular activities. The missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique needs
of students of differing ages and maturity levels”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 955 (9th Cir.
2002) (upholding a state university thesis committee’s refusal to approve a graduate student’s
thesis based on a nonconforming section under the Hazelwood standard); Kincaid v. Gibson,
236 F.3d 342, 346 nn. 4–5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Because we find that a forum analysis
requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic
forum—we agree with the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”);
Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997) (using a substantial interference test
and citing Tinker); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480
n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspapers.”); Gay Student
Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1330 (5th Cir. 1984) (using Tinker to invalidate
one justification for a college’s refusal to recognize a gay student group); Gay Students Org.
of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); Williams v. Eaton,
443 F.2d 422, 430 (10th Cir. 1971) (reversing a lower court’s dismissal of football players’
First Amendment claim when their coach dismissed them after they wore black armbands in
protest of the opposing school’s alleged racially discriminatory practices and saying “[t]he
starting point for weighing the constitutional claim of the plaintiffs is Tinker”); Norton v.
Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195, 210–11 (6th Cir. 1969) (“If, in

958

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

confusion. In 2003, it examined the First Amendment rights of student journalists at
a public university.67 The Supreme Court had previously applied a First Amendment
analysis to high school student journalists in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.68 But Judge Evans steered clear of Hazelwood’s framework, noting that
“[t]he differences between a college and a high school are far greater than the
obvious differences in curriculum and extracurricular activities” in part because
“[t]he missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique needs of students of
differing ages and maturity levels.”69 After a rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit
reversed course, embracing Hazelwood.70 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook
concluded that in some areas, like ensuring the quality of work produced under the
school’s auspices and “dissociating the school from ‘any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy,’ there is no sharp difference between
high school and college papers.”71 This blurring of standards across institutional
lines misses the fact that universities and secondary schools have different purposes
and missions—and quite plausibly different First Amendment norms and
limitations.72
Tinker, the United States Supreme Court found the evidentiary record inadequate to support
a finding of material and substantial interference with the normal operations of a junior and
senior high school; then there is certainly insufficient evidence in the present record to
support a finding of ‘material and substantial interference’ in the more adult educational
environment of a university campus.”).
67
Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2003).
68
484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
69
Hosty, 325 F.3d at 948.
70
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735–76 (7th Cir. 2005) (vacating the court’s earlier
refusal to use Hazelwood, and applying Hazelwood instead).
71
Id. at 735 (internal citations omitted). The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also
applied Hazelwood to the university setting. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277,
1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that, under Hazelwood, a school may compel a student to say
profane words in a theatrical script if the reading is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns, per Hazelwood); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir.
1991) (relying on Hazelwood to find that a university classroom, like a school newspaper, is
not a public forum and therefore a university can restrict a professor’s ability to discuss his
personal beliefs in class).
72
Consider Judge Easterbrook’s reliance on Hazelwood’s rationale that a secondary
school should be able to disassociate from “any position other than neutrality on matters of
political controversy.” Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). Easterbrook’s opinion fails to recognize that the Supreme Court
immediately qualifies that Hazelwood passage by observing that secondary schools “would
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954)). See also Papandrea, supra note 10, at 1828. (“Relying on decisions in the K–
12 and workplace contexts is deeply troubling in light of the fundamental differences
between universities, workplaces, and K–12 schools.”).
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II. CONTEMPORARY FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
The preceding observations have set forth an aspirational framework for the
dialogical, democratic, and residential university. This section explores five issues
that emerge within that framework: academic freedom, public employee speech,
public forums, safe spaces, and religious pluralism. Its formal constitutional analysis
focuses on public universities subject to the constraints of the First Amendment, but
many of its observations have normative implications for private universities. These
are certainly not the only issues facing university campuses today. In fact, they are
not even the only First Amendment issues: university lawyers regularly confront a
host of First Amendment issues including fair use of copyrighted material,73 patent
rights related to scholarly research,74 and expressive restrictions in Title IX
investigations.75 But the five issues addressed in this Part may be the ones most
closely aligned with the question of purpose suggested by MacIntyre and Murray,
an increasingly urgent question amid growing pressures on the university.
A. Academic Freedom
Modern American understandings of academic freedom first appeared in a
1915 statement by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).76
Twenty-five years later, the AAUP revisited these ideas in its 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.77 These statements suggest that one
73

See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2014)
(upholding under fair use a digitized literary database, created by a consortium of research
universities for restricted uses, against a copyright challenge).
74
See, e.g., St. John’s Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment and discussing a professor’s contractual
obligation to assign patentable inventions to his university).
75
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Northwestern’s Kipnis Cleared in Title IX Investigation,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/northwesterns-kipnis-cleared-in-title-ix-investigation/?
utm_term=.97ccd0dfb1bd [https://perma.cc/WEG6-39VE] (detailing Title IX investigation
of Northwestern University Professor Laura Kipnis, triggered by an essay she wrote for The
Chronicle of Higher Education).
76
See 1 Bull. Am. Ass’n of U. Professors, Declaration of Principles 15 (1915),
reprinted in General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,
91 Ind. L.J. 57 (2015).
77
See Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), available at
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HWC7-7XLH]
[hereinafter Statement of Principles] (In developing the preceding statement, the AAUP
collaborated with other organizations including the Association of American Colleges
(AAC), which has since been renamed the Association of American Colleges and
Universities.); See Jerry G. Gaff, ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR A NEW AGE, ASSOC. OF AM.
COLLEGE AND U. 1 (June 12, 2015), https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/Gaff_Academic
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of the core principles of academic freedom is that “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom
in the classroom in discussing their subject . . . .”78 But the realities of academic
freedom are not as clear as these ideals.
Robert Post and Matthew Finkin have observed that “[t]he American concept
of academic freedom grew directly out of the German concept of akademische
Freiheit.”79 But those who attempted to transplant the German idea “confronted an
organization of higher education very different from that which existed in
Germany.”80 The primary difference was that German universities were faculty-run
while American universities “were instead governed by a lay board chosen by a
private proprietor, by a sponsoring religious denomination, or by a political
process.”81 This difference meant that “in America nonscholars retained the right to
decide what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be
published.”82
The mismatch between academic freedom and nonacademic governance left
unclear how to resolve conflicts between a university’s institutional decision-makers
and its individual faculty members. The AAUP clearly favored the latter, a position
reinforced in some judicial rhetoric. In a 1967 decision declaring unconstitutional a
state law aimed at restricting Communist teachers, Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion asserted that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned.”83 For Brennan, academic freedom was “a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.”84
But courts have not always agreed with Justice Brennan.85 One of the most
striking qualifications to faculty academic freedom came in a 1998 case, Edwards v.
California University of Pennsylvania.86 There, a tenured professor challenged the
Freedom.pdf.
78
Statement of Principles, supra note 77, at 14.
79
FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 23.
80
Id. at 24.
81
Id. at 24.
82
Id. at 25.
83
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
84
Id.
85
Walter Metzger has described the professional and judicial definitions of academic
freedom as “seriously incompatible and probably ultimately irreconcilable.” Walter P.
Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1988). Metzger also observes that “no American court had ruled
that any provision of the federal constitution protected academic freedom” until the middle
of the twentieth century. Id. at 1285. The Supreme Court’s earliest consideration of these
issues (in the context of public schoolteachers rather than university faculty) relied on the
First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, not academic freedom. See, e.g., Adler
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
86
156 F.3d 488 (3d. Cir. 1998).
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university’s decision to restrict his choice of classroom materials and suspend him
with pay for part of an academic term after he purportedly used a course to advance
his religious views.87 In an opinion authored by then-Judge Samuel Alito, the Third
Circuit concluded that “a public university professor does not have a First
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom.”88 The Eleventh
Circuit held similarly in Bishop v. Aronov89 that it could “not find support to
conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.”90
Even judicial rhetoric more friendly to academic freedom has sometimes
focused on the institution of the university rather than the individual faculty member.
For example, Justice Frankfurter’s oft-quoted Sweezy91 concurrence emphasized
“‘four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study.”92 Other cases have further suggested that conflicts between
professor and university will be resolved in favor of the university.93 The Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this issue. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,94 it concluded
that the First Amendment provided limited protection to a public employee’s private
speech but left open the question of whether its approach to public employee speech
“would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship
or teaching.”95 Since Garcetti, three circuit courts have ruled against tenured
professors who asserted violations of First Amendment academic freedom rights,

87

Id. at 489–90.
Id. at 491.
89
926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
90
Id. at 1075.
91
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
92
Id. at 262 (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (Elbert van de
Sandt Centlivres et al., eds., Johannasburg: Whitwatersrand Univ. Press (1957)) (emphasis
added).
93
See, e.g., Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986) (“To accept
plaintiff’s contention that an untenured teacher’s grading policy is constitutionally protected
and insulates him from discharge when his standards conflict with those of the university
would be to constrict the university in defining and performing its educational mission. The
first amendment does not require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto
himself.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (defining
academic freedom as “[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education . . . .”); Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3rd Cir. 2001) (holding that a public
university professor’s First Amendment right to expression does not apply to the school’s
grade assignment procedures); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that—compared to other public employees—public university professors do not
have any additional, academic freedom-based rights); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ.,
665 F.2d 547, 553 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting plaintiff professor’s claim that his refusal
to assign a certain grade constituted a constitutionally protected teaching method).
94
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
95
Id. at 425.
88
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either denying such a right on the merits or finding it was not clearly established for
purposes of qualified immunity.96
The judicial presumption that academic freedom belongs to the university
rather than to individual faculty members is at odds with the norms espoused by the
AAUP. Moreover, some of the reasoning underlying that intuition seems deeply
misguided. For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s Aronov opinion expressed a “trust
that the University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in
pursuit of academic freedom.”97 In the court’s view, “University officials are
undoubtedly aware that quality faculty members will be hard to attract and retain if
they are to be shackled in much of what they do.”98 This kind of market solution
ignores the likelihood that some of the most unpopular and destabilizing views will
be rejected across most institutions; think, for example, of faculty advocating for
civil rights on university campuses in the Jim Crow South.
On the other hand, individual faculty do not have an unfettered ability to teach
whatever they want in the classroom. Nobody thinks a physics professor has a First
Amendment right to teach French poetry instead of electricity and magnetism in her
introductory physics course. Perhaps the classroom comes closer to a limited public
forum in which expressive freedoms are contextually limited. Just as aspiring
96

Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 770 (7th Cir. 2008); Hong v. Grant, 403 F. App’x.
236, 237 (9th Cir. 2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2009). All of these
cases involved administrative functions rather than the scholarship or teaching mentioned in
Garcetti. The assumption that academic freedom is an institutional—rather than an
individual—right also draws some support from the Supreme Court’s analysis of affirmative
action in higher education. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (contending that a university can “make its own judgments
as to education”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (adopting Powell’s
reasoning). See also Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
545 F.3d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (J. Edwards, concurring) (concluding that Grutter adopted
and extended institutional academic freedom by granting constitutional protection to
admissions decisions); Judith Areen, Government As Educator: A New Understanding of
First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 981
(2009) (arguing that Grutter “extended academic freedom beyond research and teaching to
cover the kinds of academic matters embodied in the four essential freedoms.”).
97
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Peter A. Joy,
Government Interference with Law School Clinics and Access to Justice: When Is There a
Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2011) (discussing these three cases
and suggesting that “[w]hile the Garcetti Court appeared to signal that faculty teaching and
scholarship were different than public employee speech and entitled to greater First
Amendment protection, the circuit courts have not been so generous”). Joy also notes that
some courts have attempted to insulate university decision-making from interference from
state legislatures. Id. at 1097–98.
98
Bishop, 926 F. 2d at 1075; see also FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 39 (“If the First
Amendment protects the interests of individual persons to speak as they wish, academic
freedom protects the interests of society in having a professoriat that can accomplish its
mission.”).
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musicians have no First Amendment right to showcase their talents in a town hall
meeting devoted to a local ballot initiative, so too can the classroom be restrictively
focused on particular subject matter.
On closer inspection, however, even the analogy to a limited public forum falls
short. Suppose the physics professor insisted on teaching that magnetic fields were
caused by invisible goblins rather than electromagnetic force. Neither principles of
academic freedom nor the First Amendment would protect her ability to teach this
perspective. Few people would be bothered by restrictions on the goblin-touting
physics professor. But what about more controversial examples, like the science
professor who rejects climate change, the medical school professor who advocates
for or against sex reassignment surgeries, or the international relations professor who
denies the sovereignty of Israel or Palestine?
In the context of academic freedom, departing from First Amendment norms
against viewpoint discrimination may leave controversial scholarly claims
unprotected. And it is not clear at what point a particular claim moves from
controversial to impermissible—or who gets to make that determination. Post and
Finkin suggest that “the production of knowledge requires not merely the negative
liberty to speculate free from censorship but also an affirmative commitment to the
virtues of reason, fairness, and accuracy.”99 That commitment might work well in
certain scientific inquiries, but its application in the humanities is far less clear. How,
for example, can humanities scholars commit to the virtue of reason when at times
the definition of reason itself is contested?100 Nor can Post and Finkin escape this
puzzle by appealing to “compliance with professional norms” and “professional
regulation.”101 As recent examples suggest, entire disciplines—or at least the key
gatekeepers to disciplinary power—can be captured more by politicized viewpoints
than “commitment to the virtues of reason, fairness, and accuracy.”102
Focusing on the university’s purpose as a place of constrained disagreement
can help address both these seemingly irresolvable tensions and the strains between
individual faculty and institutional governance that arise under the umbrella of
99

FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 42–43.
See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(1981) (arguing that forms of reason are based on tradition-dependent argumentative
practices); STANLEY HAUERWAS, How to Be Theologically Funny, in THE WORK OF
THEOLOGY (2015) (making a similar critique of “practical reason”).
101
FINKIN & POST, supra note 9, at 43.
102
See, e.g., Jose Luis Bermudez, Defining ‘Harm’ in the Tuvel Affair, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (May 5, 2017) (discussing the open letter against philosophy professor Rebecca Tuvel
for her article exploring parallels between being transgender and being transracial)
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2017/05/05/real-damage-done-flare-over-philosoph
ers-journal-article-essay [https://perma.cc/ST8Q-EXGT]; Andrew Koppelman, Corrupting
the
National
Book
Award?,
BALKINIZATION
(October
26,
2017),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/10/corrupting-national-book-award.html [https://perma.cc
/DV47-THA8] (critiquing the selection of Nancy MacClean’s Democracy in Chains: The
Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America as a finalist for the National
Book Award despite egregious and widely documented errors in the book).
100
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academic freedom. Intelligibly warring creeds require a kind of structured discourse
in the university and most especially in the classroom. That emphasis suggests that
faculty have broad but not unfettered discretion to explore contested and
controversial subjects and viewpoints. But constraint and intelligibility impose some
limits. In some subjects, they might also place a greater responsibility on the
classroom instructor to remember her primary role in facilitating constrained
disagreement and warring creeds. Accepting this purpose of the university means
that in the classroom, the instructor acts as teacher and facilitator more than activist
and indoctrinator. That emphasis has implications for pedagogy, content selection,
and broader curricular priorities.
B. Public Employee Speech
A second issue at the intersection of the university’s purpose and its expressive
limits is speech by university employees. Many members of a public university—
faculty, staff, administrators, and even some students—are also public employees
subject to special restrictions on their speech and conduct.103 The framework for
assessing these restrictions comes from the Supreme Court’s public employee
speech cases. 104 Unfortunately, these cases are themselves murky about the line
between “public” and “private” speech by public employees and what kinds of topics
qualify as matters of “public concern” sufficient to trigger additional employer
restrictions.
In the university context, courts have insufficiently defined the intersection
between academic freedom and limits on public employee speech.105 For example,
in Hong v. Grant, a federal district court held that a university professor was not
entitled to First Amendment protection for remarks he made during promotion and
hiring decisions.106 The court concluded that a public university’s internal staffing
practices were of little public concern.107 But this singular attention to matters of
public concern neglects other First Amendment values. For example, comments
regarding promotion and hiring may be highly relevant to matters of academic
freedom in ways that warrant greater rather than less First Amendment protection.

103

See Papandrea, supra note 10, for a recent consideration of university students’ free
speech rights generally.
104
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
105
See Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine
and Academic Speech After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1223 (2010)
(“Professors must therefore proceed at their own risk when raising concerns about
departmental matters and the self-governance process, as courts could view this speech as
nothing more than employee grievances that fail to constitute a matter of public concern.”).
106
Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 403 F. App’x
236 (9th Cir. 2010).
107
Id.

2018]

THE PURPOSE (AND LIMITS) OF THE UNIVERSITY

965

Some courts have applied the framework for public employee speech to
university students. In Marcum v. Dahl, the Tenth Circuit analogized studentathletes to government employees.108 The case involved University of Oklahoma
basketball team members who complained to their athletic director and the media
about their head coach and subsequently lost their scholarships due to their “attitude
and behavior.”109 The court concluded that the students were public employees and
their comments did not involve matters of public concern.110
Courts have also upheld expressive restrictions on students enrolled in
professional and preprofessional programs.111 In Tatro v. University of Minnesota,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected a First Amendment claim by Amanda
Tatro, an undergraduate student enrolled in the University of Minnesota’s mortuaryscience program.112 Tatro had made several off-color Facebook posts about the
cadavers she was dissecting.113 When these posts came to light, the university
contended that Tatro had engaged in “unprofessional conduct.”114 School officials
failed her in the class, placed her on probation for her remaining time at the
university, required her to enroll in an ethics course, and mandated a psychiatric
evaluation.115 The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the school’s decisions,
108

Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 733.
110
Id. at 734; see also Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (D. Kan. 2005)
(analyzing a University of Kansas track athlete’s claim under public employee speech
doctrine and concluding that the student’s speech leading to his loss of athletic scholarship
did not touch upon matters of public concern); see generally, James Hefferan, Picking Up
the Flag? The University of Missouri Football Team and Whether Intercollegiate StudentAthletes May Be Penalized for Exercising Their First Amendment Rights, 12 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 68 (2016) (exploring “whether intercollegiate studentathletes may be penalized for exercising their First Amendment right to freedom of speech”).
111
A professional school consists of coursework that prepares students for careers in
specific fields. Although most of these are graduate-level programs, some schools also offer
undergraduate degrees in specific professions. These are distinct from a traditional graduate
school where students focus primarily on mastering a particular field of study and do not
focus on training for a specific career. See CORNELL CAREER SERVICES, GRADUATE &
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL, CORNELL UNIV. 1 (2016), https://www.career.cornell.edu/resources
/upload/Graduate-School-Guide-16-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/39LJ-DRG].
112
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on other
grounds, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
113
Id. at 814. Tatro commented that she “[r]ealized with great sadness that my best
friend, Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to accompany him
to the retort [sic]. Now where will I go or who will I hang with when I need to gather my
sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket.” Id.
114
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012); see also Minn. Stat. §
149A.70, subd. 7(3) (2010) (“[U]nprofessional conduct [of a mortician] includes the ‘failure
to treat the body of the deceased’ or ‘the family or relatives of the deceased’ ‘with dignity
and respect.’”).
115
Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 815.
109

966

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

concluding that Tatro’s “Facebook posts materially and substantially disrupted the
work and discipline of the university . . . .”116
Applying public employee speech to students raises several line-drawing
questions. If public universities can regulate the speech and conduct of athletes and
preprofessional students, then what about students on academic scholarships or
those participating in work-study programs? And how far into students’ personal
lives do these restrictions extend? These questions are not easily answered, but
focusing on the university’s purpose might inform decisions about student and
employee speech. Expression or expressive conduct in the service of constrained
disagreement or intelligibly warring creeds might warrant heightened protection
even when manifested within extracurricular rather than formally curricular
contexts.
C. Public Forums
Some of the most visible spaces for constrained disagreement on public
university campuses are public forums—the government-managed spaces where
people gather and express themselves.117 The government owns and manages these
forums, but within those spaces, anyone can say almost anything.118 The ideal of the
public forum reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”119 Yet this ideal faces
practical constraints.
The limits on First Amendment activity in a public forum fall under what the
Court has called content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.120 The doctrine
116

Id. at 822. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that standards for online
speech by students in secondary schools could be applied to pre-professional university
students. Id. at 821; see also Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (D. Minn. 2014),
aff’d, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016).
117
See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 259–93 (2009) (explaining the history of political
and social activism on university campuses and the characteristics of public universities that
facilitate this activism).
118
Speech that advocates imminent lawless action is prohibited. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not proscribe advocacy of the use
of force “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action”). Certain “unprotected” categories of speech can also be restricted. See, e.g., Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that obscenity does not receive First
Amendment protection because it is “utterly without redeeming social importance”). The
limits on discourse in the public forum are otherwise minimal.
119
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (referring to streets and parks as
“quintessential public forums”).
120
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable
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is far from clear; as Steven Shiffrin has suggested, “if content neutrality is the First
Amendment emperor, the emperor has no clothes.”121 Content neutrality misses the
expressive connection between a message and the time, place, and manner in which
it occurs.
The challenges of the public forum doctrine are even more pronounced within
the varied spaces of a public university.122 Dormitories and classrooms are not the
same as open public spaces.123 More generally, the university also differs from
“quintessential public forums” like public streets and public parks.124 As one court
has observed:
[T]he purpose of a university is strikingly different from that of a public
park. Its essential function is not to provide a forum for general public
expression and assembly; rather, the university campus is an enclave
created for the pursuit of higher learning by its admitted and registered
students and by its faculty.125

time, place, or manner restrictions.”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (“A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction
is that the restriction ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’”
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980))).
121
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 66
(1999).
122
See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A university campus
will surely contain a wide variety of fora on its grounds.”); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967,
976–77 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[L]abeling the campus as one single type of forum is an impossible,
futile task.”); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme
Court’s forum analysis jurisprudence does not require us to choose between the polar
extremes of treating an entire university campus as a forum designated for all types of speech
by all speakers, or, alternatively, as a limited forum where any reasonable restriction on
speech must be upheld.”); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F.Supp.2d 853, 860 (N.D. Tex. 2004)
(noting that the “entire University campus is not a public forum subject to strict scrutiny,”
but the “University, by express designation, may open up more of the residual campus as
public forums for its students, but it can not designate less”).
123
See generally Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing
that a classroom is not the same as an open public space); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir. 1991) (discussing that a classroom is not the same as an open public space); Bd.
of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (discussing that a college
dormitory is not the same as an open public space).
124
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983). See also Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x
501, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he great weight of authority . . . has rejected the notion that
open areas on a public university campus are traditional public fora.”); Haragan, 346 F.
Supp. 2d at 860 (The “entire University campus is not a public forum subject to strict
scrutiny.”).
125
Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1233–34.
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On the other hand, this broad characterization of the university does not insulate
all spaces from expression. Campus space that is “physically indistinguishable from
public sidewalks” or otherwise blends into noncampus areas can still qualify as a
traditional public forum.126 But unlike a city park or street with clearly marked
boundaries, the ambiguous borders of traditional public forums within public
universities can sometimes create “an impermissible amount of doubt” for a
potential speaker.127 This potential chilling effect has led at least two federal circuits
to extend traditional forum analysis to spaces adjacent to sidewalks and open
areas. 128
The unique context of the public university permits certain speaker-based
distinctions that would be unavailable in traditional public forums.129 For example,
126

See McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because the perimeter
sidewalks at [Tennessee Tech University] blend into the urban grid and are physically
indistinguishable from public sidewalks, they constitute traditional public fora.”); Brister v.
Faulkner, 214 F.3d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding “a unique piece of university property
that is, for all constitutional purposes, indistinguishable from the Austin city sidewalk” to be
a traditional public forum); Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that the sidewalks surrounding a university’s campus are traditional public forums).
But see Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1233–34 (“Even though GSU’s campus possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum—including open sidewalks, streets, and pedestrian malls—
it differs in many important ways from public streets or parks. Perhaps most important, the
purpose of a university is strikingly different from that of a public park. . . . Nor is this case
like [a case where the Supreme Court’s sidewalks] were indistinguishable from other public
sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and, thus, constituted traditional public fora. Here, the
sidewalks, Pedestrian Mall, and Rotunda are all contained inside of the GSU campus. All of
the University’s entrances are identified with large blue signs and brick pillars, all of the
buildings are identified with large blue signs, and all of its parking lots have signs restricting
their use to GSU community members.” (internal citations omitted)).
127
Brister, 214 F.3d at 682–83 (5th Cir. 2000) (“If individuals are left to guess whether
they have crossed some invisible line between a public and non-public forum, and if that line
divides two worlds—one in which they are free to engage in free speech, and another in
which they can be held criminally liable for that speech—then there can be no doubt that
some will be less likely to pursue their constitutional rights, even in the world where their
speech would be protected.”).
128
See id.; see also McGlone, 681 F.3d at 734–45 (finding requirements that potential
speakers obtain advance permission to be an unconstitutional restriction on the evangelist’s
free speech rights in a traditional public forum).
129
Universities’ restrictions on speech can affect a range of actors including professors,
administrators, staff, coaches, and others. See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated
Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and
Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 483 (2005) (citing Galdikas v. Fagan, 342
F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2003) (students)); Besser v. Hardy, 260 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 970 (2002) (professors); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177,
1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (coaches); Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 224 superseding 146 F.3d
304 (5th Cir. 1998) (employees as consultants or expert witnesses); American Future Sys. v.
Pa. State Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 1980) (vendors); American Future Sys. v. Pa.
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the Eleventh Circuit recently noted that an evangelist not associated with the
university was “not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the
forum was created,” and thus could be “constitutionally restricted from undertaking
expressive conduct” on areas that the university opened for expressive speech by
campus community members.130 The Eighth Circuit has also upheld permit
requirements for nonuniversity speakers based on safety and space concerns.131
Within the university context, we might return to the idea of constrained
disagreement to think about limits on the public forum. When a university
functionally treats a space as a public forum—a green space, walkway, or bridge
that can be painted with messages—it triggers a high presumption against viewpoint
discrimination. Even so, it can still impose time, place, and manner restrictions, and
it can “manage” the forum to ensure that all voices have a reasonable opportunity to
make their perspectives known. And unlike more traditional public forums, perhaps
the university should also be able to impose restrictions against ad hominem attacks
for the sake of facilitating constrained disagreement. That possibility raises a host of
line-drawing challenges, and it may be that only certain spaces can be constrained
in this way. But on the public university campus, perhaps not every open forum
should be open in the same way.
D. Safe Spaces
In recent years, debates have erupted over whether university students should
have access to “safe spaces”—places on campus free from offensive and unsettling
expression.132 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt worry that some advocates of safe
spaces seek to transform campuses into places “where young adults are shielded

State. Univ., 688 F.2d 907, 918 (3d Cir. 1982) (vendors); Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.—Purdue
Univ. Fort Wayne, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (discussing the institution
itself as speaker).
130
Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1235. See also Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F.
Supp. 3d 1216, 1224 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (“[T]he Court accepts that the Perimeter could
theoretically be a designated public forum as to students despite being a limited public forum
as to the general public.”).
131
See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 981 (8th Cir. 2006). The court found that a
five-day cap on permits was not narrowly drawn to achieve an interest in “fostering a
diversity of viewpoints and avoiding the monopolization of space” as, “the space will go
unused even if Bowman still wants to use the space” after his five days are over. Id. at 981–
82. See also Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x 501, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding a studentsponsorship requirement as applied to a campus evangelist).
132
This section draws from Ashutosh Bhagwat & John Inazu, Searching for Safe
Spaces, INSIDE HIGHER ED (March 21, 2017), https://www.highered.com/views/2017/03/21
/easily-caricatured-safe-spaces-can-help-students-learn-essay
[https://perma.cc/46DT55G7].
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from words and ideas that make some uncomfortable.”133 Their concerns are not
entirely unwarranted. In November 2016, following the election of Donald Trump,
the University of Michigan Law School offered students “stress-busting self-care
activities” that included coloring, blowing bubbles, and sculpting with Play-Doh.134
A year earlier, student activists at the University of Missouri asked that reporters be
denied access to their tent city “so the place where people live, fellowship, and sleep
can be protected from twisted insincere narratives.”135 One Ivy League professor has
even suggested that students should be provided “campus-wide, reflective, selfaware distance from the grit of the everyday.”136
The idea of a “campus-wide” safe space raises serious practical and theoretical
concerns. But there are also dangers of overreacting with First Amendment bluster,
or ridicule, as some right-leaning critics have done in deriding advocates for safe
spaces as “snowflakes.”137 Proponents of safe spaces have some important
arguments. In fact, we know from experience that people depend upon private and
protected places to regroup, rest, and reenergize. We form our most intimate bonds
and our deepest convictions outside of the public eye, with trusted friends, in spaces
that might fairly be characterized as “safe.”
The term “safe space” saw its first consistent usage with the 1960s and 1970s
women’s movement, when it connoted “a means rather than an end and not only a
physical space but a space created by the coming together of women searching for
community.”138 Buttressed by developments in critical theory, Malcolm Harris
133

Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/thecoddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ [https://perma.cc/4K9P-5C9R].
134
Emily Zanotti, University of Michigan cancels plan to help students “cope” with
Trump using coloring books, Play-Doh and bubbles, FOXNEWS.COM (November 14, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/11/14/university-michigan-cancels-plan-to-help-students
-cope-with-trump-using-coloring-books-play-doh-and-bubbles.html [https://perma.cc/W4K
H-SVWB].
135
Conor Friedersdorf, Campus Activists Weaponize “Safe Space,” THE ATLANTIC
(November 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/how-campusactivists-are-weaponizing-the-safe-space/415080/ [https://perma.cc/5PXA-BZNF].
136
Matthew Pratt Guterl, On Safety and Safe Spaces, INSIDE HIGHER ED (August 29,
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/08/29/students-deserve-safe-spacescampus-essay [https://perma.cc/BF8V-8HBZ].
137
Emily Jashinsky, Ben Shapiro, Adam Carolla Slam Campus Safe-Space Culture in
Congressional
Hearing,
THE
WASH.
EXAMINER
(July
27,
2017),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ben-shapiro-adam-carolla-slam-campus-safe-spaceculture-in-congressional-hearing [https://perma.cc/33F4-PTBZ] (quoting conservative
activist Ben Shapiro as stating that safe space culture “turns students into snowflakes, craven,
and pathetic”).
138
Malcolm Harris, What’s a ‘Safe Space’? A Look at the Phrase’s 50-year History,
FUSION
(Nov.
11,
2015),
http://fusion.net/story/231089/safe-space-history/
[https://perma.cc/3Y7F-PF8J]. Writing in a publication called Mind Hacks, an anonymous
author challenged Harris’s account and argued that the concept of space spaces emerged not
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asserts, the push for safe spaces evolved by the early 2000s into arguments for
“gender-neutral bathrooms, asking people’s preferred pronouns, trigger warnings,
internal education ‘anti-oppression’ trainings, and creating separate auxiliary spaces
for identity groups to organize their particular concerns.”139
Of course, in a broader sense, the idea of places where like-minded groups
could gather, organize, and seek mutual support long predates the formal use of “safe
space.”140 Black churches sustained alternative communities and social movements
through much of our nation’s history, from the antebellum era to the civil rights
era.141 The suffragist movement grew out of women who gathered not only in
conventions but also around teatimes, potato sack races, and pageants.142 Even
taverns offered private meeting places in the lead up to the American Revolution.143
The notion of a safe space builds on the idea that people develop intellectually
and relationally not only from exposure to conflicting ideas but also from the
protection of intimate and private settings. This principle is supported not only by
common sense and history but also by an important strand of constitutional law that
allows private citizens to form and participate in groups of their choosing. As Ken
White has argued, “[s]afe spaces, if designed in a principled way, are just an
application of [the freedom of association].”144
The Constitution does not explicitly protect a freedom of association, but the
Supreme Court has long recognized the right to associate, to organize, and to gather
in groups with like-minded individuals as implicit in the First Amendment rights of
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psychological safety. In other words, without judgment . . . [a] ‘safe space’ is created.” Id.
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assembly and speech.145 In one of its earliest cases acknowledging the right of
association, the Supreme Court noted that it is essential to the ability of individuals
to develop and communicate their views.146 The Court has also recognized that the
right to choose those with whom we associate—and to exclude from a group
individuals who do not share the group’s beliefs—is a central aspect of
association.147 The right to associate is the right to associate with individuals of one’s
choice. When individuals form an association, they may exclude (and shield
themselves from) opposing viewpoints. In many ways, a private association is a kind
of safe space.
The relationship between private associations and safe spaces takes on
particular importance in the context of the residential college, which contains both
sites of contested inquiry and places of intimate repose. The debate over safe spaces
raises important questions about the nature of human interaction, the limits of free
expression, and the role of the First Amendment in our civic practices. The
emergence of these debates on college campuses is not simply a function of campus
activism and progressive faculty. Rather, the nature of college campuses—including
the people, places, and purposes that comprise them—creates an environment that
illustrates both the limits and the possibilities of safe spaces.
Undergraduates at the typical residential college spend most of their waking
and sleeping hours on campus. Unlike faculty members, administrators, and
graduate students, they do not have off-campus homes to which they can easily
retreat during the school year. In this sense, residential colleges share similarities
with other institutions like secondary schools, prisons, and military bases that
present unique First Amendment challenges. The institution is neither an open public
forum nor a wholly privatized space.
Even the most vigorous academic proponents of open debate would not want
their living rooms to become open forums for diverse viewpoint expression. Most
people need to be able to retreat and rejuvenate in their homes and other intimate
social settings. In these environments, they commune with like-minded friends,
engage in informal interactions, and pursue mindless pastimes with no ideological
content at all. In these settings, people rarely want to have to defend their deepest
beliefs or confront hostility.
There will, of course, be variations among campuses, both in what a “safe
space” means and in a school’s willingness or ability to commit resources to this
area. Even here, however, the First Amendment provides some guidance. Most
notably, the Supreme Court in 1988 upheld a law banning sidewalk picketing
145
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directed at private residences, as applied to antiabortion protestors gathering on a
public sidewalk in front of a physician’s home.148 In most settings, the First
Amendment protects the right to speak and protest in public places. But the Court
recognized that the interest in preserving “residential privacy” outweighed this
general principle.149 This reasoning suggests that, at a minimum, residential
universities are entirely justified in protecting intellectual and physical privacy in
dormitories that function as students’ homes.
Legitimate calls for privacy and intimacy are not, however, limited to the home.
As the earlier discussion of the right of association suggests, people often foster their
intellectual and emotional development within groups. But groups need private
places to meet and deliberate. Students who spend their lives on campus need spaces
on campus, and cramped dorm rooms are hardly adequate. Groups of like-minded
students who wish to meet in private spaces on campus and limit attendance to those
with whom they share values and beliefs are a core example of the need for strong
associational protections.
The debate over safe spaces is unlikely to end anytime soon. But situating that
debate within the broader context of the university and the First Amendment pierces
some of the partisan framing that suggests only one side or the other has any merit.
Like the university itself, the safe space is a complex idea that, properly construed,
can help students engage more fully in the pursuit of knowledge and dialogue across
differences.
E. Religious Pluralism
A final issue at the intersection of the First Amendment and the university is
religious pluralism. The challenge of religious pluralism (which is related to the
challenge of pluralism more generally) emerges out of the institutional history of the
American university, which at its origins was pervasively Christian in nature.150 That
was true not only for private universities like Harvard and Yale but also for the first
public universities like the University of North Carolina. As historian George
Marsden has suggested, “[u]nlike some other Western countries which addressed the
problems of pluralism by encouraging multiple educational systems, the American
tendency was to build what amounted to a monolithic and homogenous educational
establishment and to force the alternatives to marginal existence on the
periphery.”151
As American universities and the broader society became more pluralistic,
baseline assumptions about religion also changed.152 Marsden suggests that the
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move away from this religious baseline can be characterized in one of two ways,
each with different implications:
On the one hand, it is a story of the disestablishment of religion. On the
other hand, it is a story of secularization. From the point of view of persons
with wholly secular values, these two ways of characterizing the history
may fit harmoniously, both being laudable . . . . For those who have
religious commitments, on the other hand, “disestablishment” and
“secularization” are likely to suggest opposed evaluations.
Disestablishment is likely to sound like a good thing, while secularization,
even if desirable in many of its forms, seems undesirable if it excludes
religion from the major areas of public life that shape people’s
sophisticated beliefs.153
This dueling narrative describing the changing relationship between the American
university and religion contextualizes contemporary challenges surrounding
religious freedom in the university.
One of the most important questions is the extent to which the university must
include religious beliefs and viewpoints. The Supreme Court has been less than clear
in approaching this question, initially signaling a commitment to robust religious
pluralism but more recently suggesting that a different set of commitments might
qualify or even nullify genuine religious pluralism.154
In 1981, the Court addressed the question of whether public university funding
should extend to student religious groups in Widmar.155 The case arose when the
University of Missouri at Kansas City prohibited the use of buildings or grounds
“for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”156 Members of a Christian
student group contended that the regulation violated their free exercise and free
speech rights.157 The university argued that the Establishment Clause required the
regulation.158 The Supreme Court made clear that the balance of constitutional
interests lay squarely in favor of the student group.159 Because the university had
“created a forum generally open for use by student groups,” it had “assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms.”160 That obligation extended to religious groups even though
it was “possible—perhaps even foreseeable—that religious groups will benefit from
153
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access to University facilities.”161 In fact, denying “access to the customary media
for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students”
would limit “the capacity of a group or individual ‘to participate in the intellectual
give and take of campus debate.’”162 The Court concluded that the “exclusionary
policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be
content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable
constitutional standards.”163
Justice Stevens concurred separately. In his view, the majority’s public forum
analysis would “needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public
universities.”164 Stevens elaborated:
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a
university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of
communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library,
they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they
select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars
for what they have written. In addition, in encouraging students to
participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make decisions
concerning the content of those activities.165
Stevens’ argument stretches the notion of academic freedom beyond even that
proposed by the AAUP.166 Under his view, little within the university falls outside
the purview of academic freedom—or at least academic freedom for “the managers
of a university,” many of whom are not themselves research and teaching faculty.167
While the student petitioners in Widmar asserted both free exercise and free
speech violations, the Supreme Court framed the case entirely around free speech
doctrine. Fifteen years later, it reinforced this approach in Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of University of Virginia.168 In that case, the University of Virginia
provided funding for student-run publications but withheld funds from a particular
publication because it “primarily promote[d] or manifeste[d] a particular belie[f] in
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”169 Using a free speech analysis, the Supreme
Court rejected the university’s viewpoint discrimination, concluding that the
purpose of the university’s funding scheme was “to encourage a diversity of views
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from private speakers.”170 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion added that “[f]or the
University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students
risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers
for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses.”171
Widmar and Rosenberger both assert strong protections for religious pluralism,
but both subsume any distinctive free exercise concerns into a monolithic free
speech doctrine. Were this simply a doctrinal shift, religious pluralism might remain
viable in the university under a different name. But the Court’s more recent
consideration of these issues suggests otherwise. In 2010, Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez172 upheld Hastings College of the Law’s “all comers” policy that required
all student groups to accept any student as a member. 173 Hastings denied official
recognition to a Christian Legal Society (CLS) student chapter because the group
limited membership and leadership on the basis of sexual conduct and religious
belief, in violation of the school’s policy.174 In addition to withholding modest
funding and the use of its logo, Hastings denied the CLS chapter the opportunity to
send mass e-mails to the student body, to participate in the annual student
organizations fair, and to reserve on-campus meeting spaces.175 CLS filed suit in
federal district court asserting violations of expressive association and free
speech.176
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a five-justice majority applied a speech-based
public forum analysis and concluded that the all-comers policy was “a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum.” 177 In fact,
according to Justice Ginsburg, the policy was “textbook viewpoint neutral” because
it applied equally to all groups.178 Yet elsewhere in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg
noted approvingly that Hastings’ all-comers policy “encourages tolerance,
cooperation, and learning among students”179 and “conveys the Law School’s
decision ‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which
the people of California disapprove.’”180 These normative assertions sound like
170
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Justice Ginsburg was attempting to justify Hastings’ policy under a government
speech rationale. But the assertions are not “textbook viewpoint neutral.”181 And
they are at odds with “Hastings’ proclaimed policy of fostering a diversity of
viewpoints among registered student groups.”182
If Justice Ginsburg is correct that there can be no clearer case of content
neutrality than an all-comers policy, it is difficult to see how a commitment to
religious pluralism survives in the university context. A great number of religious
groups hold exclusive truth claims and require their adherents to affirm those claims.
Their approach to membership and leadership is fundamentally incompatible with
an “all comers” norm.183
CONCLUSION
Issues of academic freedom, public employee speech, public forums, safe
spaces, and religious pluralism highlight the intersection of the First Amendment
and the university as a place of constrained disagreement and intelligibly warring
creeds. Viewing these questions through this lens can also remind us of the
university’s limits. Wellmon drives home this point in his reflection on the
University of Virginia’s uninspired response to white supremacists:
The university has moral limitations. Universities cannot impart
comprehensive visions of the good. They cannot provide ultimate moral
ends. Their goods are proximate. Faculty members, myself included, need
to acknowledge that most university leaders lack the language and moral
imagination to confront evils such as white supremacy. They lack those
things not because of who they are, but, as Weber argued, because of what
the modern research university has become. Such an acknowledgment is
also part of the moral clarity that we can offer to ourselves and to our
students. We have goods to offer, but they are not ultimate goods.184
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Recognizing the limits of the goods of the university can also remind the university
and its leaders of the need “to look outside themselves and partner with other moral
traditions and civic communities.”185 At the same time, universities remain
“uniquely positioned to help students engage in open debates and conversations
about the values they hold most dear.”186 It is not that the goods of the university do
not matter—they matter a great deal. The university can only take us so far, but we
still need it to take us there.
If the university could be a place for MacIntyre’s constrained disagreement and
Murray’s intelligibly warring creeds, it could help initiate students into the kind of
conflict through which they learn to live together rather than fracture through
indifference, apathy, or violence. Students and faculty could push each other toward
a more generous dialogue across difference and wrestle with difficult concepts
without giving up on one another. This country, now as much as ever, needs such
places. Citizens of the university are also citizens of a much larger political project,
where the stakes are much higher, the differences much starker, and the possibilities
for dialogue often much smaller. The vision of the First Amendment is ultimately
not just a vision for the university, but a vision for this broader political endeavor.
And the university confident in its purpose, and cognizant of its limits, might be just
the place to begin.
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